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When Do You Want It? Time, Decisions, and
Public Policy
John G. Lynch Jr. and Gal Zauberman
Most consumer decisions involve trade-offs of costs and benefits over time. The research literature on
“intertemporal choice” examines behavioral regularities in how people think about such decisions,
drawing from marketing, psychology, and behavioral economics. This diverse literature is relevant to
the analysis of public policy issues related to consumers’ discounting of future outcomes “too much”
compared with sooner outcomes. A stream of outcomes can be viewed as occurring in three temporal
regions: the present, the near future, and the more distant future. Somewhat different research
streams have developed around the topic of underweighting outcomes in the distant (compared with
the near) future and of overweighting outcomes in the present compared with any point in the future.
The authors review key concepts from the literature on underweighting the distant future versus the
near-term future to analyze policy issues related to consumers’ saving for retirement and their
response to rebates. The authors review key concepts from the literature on impulsive behavior and
present-biased preferences to analyze the problems of self-control that people have in their
consumption of “sin” products that are proximate and that affect rewards in the present. The authors
critique current information and incentive remedies that ignore behavioral principles from the
literature, focusing their recommendations on policy interventions designed to influence eating habits
and obesity and on cooling-off laws that govern return policies for consumers’ big-ticket purchases.
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Most consumer decisions involve trade-offs of costsand benefits over time. For example, a consumersuffering from chronic pain may weigh the near-
term advantages of a Cox-2 inhibitor drug, such as Vioxx, in
protecting the stomach against a slight elevation in heart
attack risk in the more distant future. A dieter may weigh the
immediate pleasure of a luscious chocolate cake against
short-term weight gain or long-term problems of obesity. A
person buying a refrigerator may weigh purchase price
against life-cycle energy cost. A factory worker may weigh
whether to replace a two-year-old car with a shiny new
model against driving the old car and saving for retirement.
A home computer buyer must decide whether to upgrade to
a new package that received better reviews but would
involve significant time investment in the short run to learn
the new package.
In making such decisions, consumers typically weigh
immediate outcomes more heavily than more distant ones.
Although there are normative, “rational” reasons to do so,
there are many domains that are relevant to public policy in
which consumers make “mistakes” by giving undue weight
to outcomes in the present or the near term compared with
those in the long term. Therefore, understanding how con-
sumers think about present and future consequences is criti-
cal to any public policy analysis of consumer decisions that
have an intertemporal component. Research in marketing,
psychology, and behavioral decision making can inform
such public policy analysis.
Economic theory suggests that the normative model for
intertemporal decisions is the discounted utility model
(Samuelson 1937). Utility at time t for a stream of outcomes
from time t to some end time T, Ut(ct, …, cT), is simply the
weighted sum of instantaneous utility, u(ct + k), at each
period t + k over that range:
Here, D(k), the weight attached to utility in time t + k, will
be 1 when k = 0 (delay = 0). If the discount factor ρ is posi-
tive, utility in subsequent periods will receive progressively
less weight.
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1Other articles in this special issue address the issue of the psychology of
saving versus spending (see Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2006; Botti
and Iyengar 2006; Briley and Aaker 2006).
Despite its normative appeal, this model is descriptively
inadequate. Two excellent recent reviews summarize a large
body of work in psychology, behavioral economics, and
consumer research that has documented numerous “anom-
alies” in how consumers actually make decisions between
smaller, sooner rewards or costs and larger, later ones (Fred-
erick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002; Read 2004).
Different studies show vastly different revealed discount
rates that seem to depend on a host of contextual factors that
are normatively irrelevant. We do not review this vast liter-
ature in any detail; rather, we focus our analysis on classes
of consumer decisions in which consumers make potentially
bad decisions by being myopic and underweighting future
consequences.
Intertemporal decisions can involve a stream of outcomes
that occur in the present, the near future, and the more dis-
tant future. Somewhat different research literature has
developed around the topic of underweighting outcomes in
the distant (compared with the near-term) future and of
overweighting outcomes in the present (compared with any
future period).
This literature also maps onto different public policy
domains. Underweighting the distant future versus the near-
term future is relevant to policy that affects behaviors in
which the payoffs for good behavior occur in the long term,
such as saving for retirement or environmental protection.1
Another set of problems arises when the decision involves
outcomes that are more proximate. A large body of work
shows that when decisions involve immediate rewards,
people are impulsive and exhibit present-biased preferences
that cannot be accounted for simply by assuming a high dis-
count rate. This can lead to problems of self-control to avoid
short-term temptations (“sin” products). Work in this area is
relevant to policy interventions designed to affect eating
habits and obesity and influence teens’ risky sexual behav-
ior and to cooling-off laws that govern return policies for
consumers’ big-ticket purchases.
Weighting the Near-Term Versus Long-
Term Future
We begin our analysis with an examination of decisions that
involve trade-offs, rewards, or costs in the near-term future
versus the more distant future. In some important policy
domains, the question arises whether consumers discount
“too much”; that is, are they insufficiently attentive to out-
comes that will occur in the more distant future? For exam-
ple, it has often been noted that U.S. workers save relatively
little for retirement (Thaler and Benartzi 2004; Thaler and
Sheffrein 1981). This implies that people discount too
much; that is, they too strongly prefer consumption in the
near future compared with consumption in later periods.
Related to the issue of private savings is the issue of gov-
ernment entitlements for retirees. Debates about how to save
the social security system are sometimes framed in terms of
intragenerational fairness to rich versus poor citizens, but
these debates are equally relevant to intergenerational trade-
offs, namely, below-the-surface disputes about the relative
weight that should be placed on public burden experienced
in the present versus a more distant point in the future, when
new tax revenues would need to be raised to cover social
security payments. Similarly, policy analysis of environ-
mental protection often pits the current generation’s con-
sumption of resources and disposal of wastes against the
interests of subsequent generations (Okrent 1999; Wade-
Benzoni 1999).
In each case, it could be argued that consumers, or their
governmental representatives, are making a mistake. If
incurring a deficit to reform social security is bad for the
economy today, why should that matter more than the bur-
den of an even larger deficit in 20 years? Work on intertem-
poral choice can shed light on the thinking that underlies
consumer perceptions of these issues.
Psychological Foundations of Discount Rates
Discounting has multiple causes. Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue (2002) and Read (2004) distinguish “time
preference” from “discounting.” They define time prefer-
ence as a preference to receive utility today versus the same
utility in the future. They use the broader label of “dis-
counting” to refer to any reason a person might prefer con-
sumption today to consumption tomorrow, including the
expectation that the future consequence confers less utility
than a similar, present consequence. Frederick, Loewen-
stein, and O’Donoghue note that a future benefit might have
less expected utility than a more immediate benefit because
the future consequence is less certain to occur or because a
person anticipates that his or her tastes may change in the
future. A future cost may seem less of a burden than a pre-
sent one because opportunity costs are greater in the present
or because a person expects to have more wealth in the
future.
All these examples are arguably “rational” reasons to dis-
count future outcomes. For example, if a person is unsure of
whether he or she will be alive in 20 years, it may be ratio-
nal to value current consumption over later consumption. If
a person believes that, in the future, his or her tastes might
change, it may be rational to give less weight to future con-
sumption of a good that is highly valued today. If a person
believes that investing a resource now will force him or her
to forgo other valued opportunities that need not be forgone
if invested in the future, it may be rational to view invest-
ment in the future as less of a burden than investment today.
If a person expects to be wealthier in the future, it may be
rational to prefer to pay a much larger amount in several
years than a small amount now.
As we subsequently show, however, discounting behavior
is caused by certain psychological factors that cannot be
anticipated by an economic analysis. We review two general
theories of discounting, one that explains discounting of
future resources according to their greater availability in the
future than today and one that points to systematic differ-
ences in the cognitive representation of events in the near
future versus the more distant future. We analyze consumer
decisions about saving and spending and about consumer
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2This might explain how guest editors John Lynch and Wendy Wood
convinced all the other authors to write invited articles for this special
issue. Despite those authors’ acute sense of being overcommitted in the
present, they imagined being less busy in the future when the time came to
write the articles.
response to rebates in terms of these two theoretical
frameworks.
Resource Slack and Resource Differences in
Discount Rates
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) note that Equation 1 implies
that utility is being discounted, so any resource that affects
utility might be expected to be discounted at the same rate.
However, they note that evidence exists that contradicts this
assumption. For example, Chapman (1996) estimates
people’s discount rates for health and money and finds little
correlation between individual money and health discount
rates.
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) propose a general theory of
why resources might be discounted at different rates,
founded on the concept of perceived “resource slack” at dif-
ferent points in time. Slack is the perceived surplus of a
given resource available to complete some focal task.
Zauberman and Lynch argue that people discount delayed
expenditures of a limited resource when (1) immediate
investment of the resource would block the accomplishment
of other concurrently activated goals that require the
resource and (2) they expect to have more resource slack in
the future and, thus, less sacrifice of other highly valued
goals that require the same resource. Discounting and desire
to delay investment are driven by perceptions of “slack
gain” (or loss) for a given resource over time.
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) evaluate this slack gain
theory by testing deductions about how two generic
resources, time and money, are discounted at different rates.
They predict and find that, on average, people expect to
have more time slack in the future than they do today but
that people do not have an equally optimistic expectation of
having more money in the near future. In a series of experi-
ments, Zauberman and Lynch show that people exhibit
higher discount rates for investments of time than for invest-
ments of money. That is, people would be willing to invest
considerably more time for some worthwhile pursuit in a
month than tomorrow, but the same is not true with money.2
Zauberman and Lynch (2005) further show that the
greater discounting of time than of money occurs only under
conditions in which people expect slack to increase in the
future more rapidly for time than for money. Participants
who expected to have more money but not more time in the
future showed the opposite pattern; that is, they discounted
future money donations more than future time donations.
This was important in demonstrating the key causal role of
changes in slack in explaining discounting and differences
in how people discount different resources.
The everyday manifestation of this irrational exuberance
about time that most people exhibit is what Zauberman and
Lynch (2005) call the “Yes … Damn!” effect. People over- 3Liberman and Trope (1998) show that people think about distant events
in terms of more superordinate goals (ends) and nearer events in terms of
more subordinate goals (means to ends). The greater abstractness of
thoughts about the more distant future is reflected in people using fewer,
broader categories to classify events in the long term than in the short term
(Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope 2002, Study 1). Distant events are repre-
sented in a less complex, less multidimensional way (Liberman, Sagristano,
and Trope 2002, Study 2). More distant events are decontextualized, and
nearer events are more contextualized (Nussbaum, Trope, and Liberman
2003).
commit and agree to time-consuming activities in the future
(“Yes”) that they would refuse if such activities needed to
be done right away because they expect to have less compe-
tition for their time in the future than in the present. When
the distant future turns into today, however, people discover
that other competing activities have arisen and that they are
just as busy as they were a month ago when they committed;
thus, they curse themselves—“Damn!”
The interesting question is, Why do people not learn from
their repeated mistakes? Zauberman and Lynch (2005) show
that people are much worse at predicting supplies of spare
time than they are of spare money. Moreover, perceptions of
time slack are “hyperbolic”; that is, at a distance, two days
in the future seem similar in spare time, but as the first of
those days draws nearer in time, people begin to view that
day as likely to be much busier than the later day. Similar
patterns are not found for money. So, people are particularly
bad at anticipating when in the future they might actually
have time to add some time-consuming activity without
regretting it.
Construal-Level Theory
A compelling body of work on construal-level theory illu-
minates differences in how people represent events in the
near and more distant future (for reviews, see Liberman,
Trope, and Stephan, in press; Trope and Liberman 2003).3
According to construal-level theory, people represent events
at a “high level” in the distant future and at a “low level” in
the more immediate future. In the near future, people think
concretely about the feasibility of action, that is, what con-
straints on action exist. In the more distant future, thoughts
are dominated by more abstraction about the desirability of
the same events.
In one of numerous demonstrations, Liberman and Trope
(1998) asked Israeli students to choose between assignment
topics, some of which had to be completed in English and
some in the students’ native Hebrew. Some assignments
were to be completed within a week, and some were to be
completed much later in the term. For each point in time,
students chose between assignments in English, which were
shown in pretests to be more interesting (high desirability
but low feasibility), and assignments in Hebrew on less
interesting topics (low desirability but high feasibility). The
results showed that in the near term, people chose the less
interesting assignments in Hebrew. For the more distant
future, they chose the more interesting assignments in
English. Thus, the relative weights of feasibility and desir-
ability considerations change as a function of temporal
distance.
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4In the endowment effect, participants are randomly assigned to be buy-
ers or sellers of a good (e.g., a mug). Sellers endowed with the mug become
Other findings show that for distant events, people give
relatively more weight to primary, core (i.e., high level)
attributes of products and goals for their use and less weight
to secondary, surface (i.e., low level) aspects of the same
products (Trope and Liberman 2000). For example, in a
choice between two clock radio sets, one with good sound
but a less useful clock and one with a good clock but lower-
quality sound, sound quality may be higher level if the main
reason for purchasing the radio is to listen to music, but if
the primary purpose in buying a clock radio is to wake up in
the morning, the clock may be primary. Trope and Liberman
(2000) show that in each situation, the relative weight of the
primary feature increases with temporal distance.
Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman (2002) further argue
that for probabilistic events, payoffs are high level and prob-
abilities are low level. After all, the payoff is the primary
reason for taking the gamble, and probability is just a con-
straint on achieving the payoff. Sagristano, Trope, and
Liberman show that in evaluations of gambles and choice
among gambles, people who make decisions that are to take
effect in the near term give relatively more weight to proba-
bility and less to payoff than if the outcomes of the same
gambles were to occur only in the more distant future.
Finally, Eyal and colleagues (2004) argue that in people’s
evaluations of actions, pros (i.e., reasons to undertake an
action) are higher level and more central than cons (i.e., con-
straints on action). Eyal and colleagues demonstrate that
people give more weight to pros and less weight to cons
when events are more distant than more immediate.
In summary, numerous studies have shown that mental
representations change with the temporal distance of the
outcome or event. These changes in representations change
the features of outcomes that are weighted more heavily in
decisions. Building on temporal construal theory, Zhao,
Hoeffler, and Zauberman (2005) show that asking people to
simulate the benefits of an immediate outcome mentally
before making a decision causes their immediate decisions
to become more consistent with distant-future preferences.
Policy makers who understand these principles can encour-
age behaviors that people view as more attractive in the long
run than the short run by interventions that change people’s
temporal perspective and, thus, the weighting of feasibility
and desirability considerations.
Application to Saving for Retirement
People fail to save for retirement because in the short run,
saving exacts a cost. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) have trade-
marked a plan called Save More Tomorrow, which asks
people to precommit to save future money from raises for
retirement. They report dramatic success in getting employ-
ees to join and in increasing the annual savings rate for
retirement from 3.5% to 13.6% over the course of 40
months.
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) do not interpret their plan in
terms of construal-level theory. They argue that people are
unwilling to save in the present, though they are willing to
precommit to saving in the future because of loss aversion
and a mechanism similar to an endowment effect (Kahne-
man, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990).4 However, alternative
attached and set reservation selling prices substantially higher than the buy-
ers’ reservation prices.
explanations can be offered from the perspective of tempo-
ral construal theory. It is clear that when people are making
decisions about saving in the current period, constraints and
costs should loom large compared with the potential bene-
fits of having adequate savings for retirement. When a per-
son is given a choice of precommitting future raise money
to retirement savings, the consequences are more temporally
distant. Consequently, people give more weight to benefits
and less to costs, causing participation to increase.
The same issue can be analyzed from the perspective of
Zauberman and Lynch’s (2005) resource slack theory of dis-
counting. It is common for people to observe that their
expenses always just outstrip their financial resources. So, if
people feel too cash constrained in the present, they will
probably feel just as cash constrained in the future. How-
ever, because people imagine that they will have more
financial resource slack after getting a raise, they are willing
to precommit to save tomorrow what they would not save
today. Critically, if a person waited until the time of receiv-
ing the raise to suggest banking it for retirement, many
people would decline because they would not believe that
they had adequate money slack to spare more money for
savings.
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) find that though people who
precommit to save can opt out, they rarely do so. They
argue that people do not opt out because of “status quo bias”
(Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). However, status quo
bias is more of a label for a general empirical phenomenon
than an explanation. Many processes are compatible with
preference for the status quo. For example, people may stay
with the status quo because they fail to think about it later.
Slack theory provides an alternative explanation of why
people do not opt out when the raise arrives: Opting out
takes a small amount of time and effort that seems like a
very small switching cost when a person precommits several
months before receiving a raise, but switching costs that
seem very small in the distance prove to be much more bind-
ing when the time arrives to incur them (Zauberman 2003).
This inability to forecast the subjective magnitude of a
future time cost is related to Zauberman and Lynch’s (2005)
Yes … Damn! effect; that is, people are unable to anticipate
the opportunity cost of their time in the future. Conse-
quently, when their raises arrive, people may wish to opt
out, but they have a preference to delay or procrastinate in
finding the time to do so. Suppose that a company has a
Save More Tomorrow savings plan for precommitting to
save raise money but with an opt-out alternative that could
be effortlessly chosen when the raise arrives, with paper-
work to be filled out the following month. Slack theory pre-
dicts that opting out would be much more common in this
circumstance than if the choice to opt out required immedi-
ate time costs of filling out paperwork (for evidence consis-
tent with this conjecture, see Madrian and Shea 2001).
Deceptive or Unfair Rebates?
Construal-level theory predicts that benefits loom larger
than costs in the future but not in the present (Eyal et al.
2004). This implies that rebates that require effort to redeem
should become a more potent inducement to buy if con-
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sumers are barred from redeeming the rebate for several
weeks (Soman 1998). The same point follows from resource
slack theory (Zauberman and Lynch 2005) if time required
to redeem rebates is discounted at a faster rate than the
money reward that comes from redeeming rebates.
Soman’s (1998) experimental participants made a hypo-
thetical choice between two pairs of snow pants, one pro-
moted with a rebate and one with no rebate. The rebates
required effort to redeem in the form of driving to another
location. He varied the face value of the rebate, the distance
to be driven to redeem the rebate, and whether the rebate
could be redeemed immediately or only at some point in the
future. The results showed that the percentage of respon-
dents who chose the promoted alternative actually increased
when the rebate could not be redeemed until later. Why did
this occur? Soman found that the effect of the monetary size
of the rebate was unaffected by whether rebate redemption
was immediate or in the future. That is, people did not dis-
count the future benefit. However, they did discount the
future cost. In the immediate condition, people were highly
sensitive to the level of effort to redeem the rebate; in
delayed conditions, they were insensitive to effort. That is,
future effort was discounted steeply.
In another study, Soman (1998) recruited respondents to
fill out a short survey for $1 and then gave them the chance
to forgo that amount for a larger amount if they would com-
plete a second survey. He varied independently the amount
of effort to complete the survey (four pages or eight pages),
the payment if it was completed ($2 or $4), and the exact
time at which people were instructed to redeem the ques-
tionnaire (in two weeks, in four weeks, or at any point in
time over the next four weeks). The results showed that the
payment amount had a large effect on the decision whether
to undertake a second survey, but it had no effect on whether
the payment for the longer survey was actually redeemed. In
contrast, the effort to be undertaken had relatively little
effect on choice because it would not be experienced until
the future, but amount of effort had a large effect on
redemption.
In light of these findings on temporal construal, resource
slack, and Soman’s (1998) work on the “illusion of delayed
incentives,” policy makers might devote some consideration
to whether rebates are a “deceptive” or an “unfair” form of
inducement to buy. At first blush, the obvious answer would
seem to be no. Rebates seem to be a legitimate promotional
tool as long as sellers adequately communicate the respon-
sibilities of consumers to qualify for and redeem a rebate.
Indeed, rebates are popular with consumers for offering
savings.
However, what if consumers are led to purchase one
product over the competition, relying on an unrealistic
expectation (based on aggregate evidence) that they will
later redeem the rebate? As we discussed previously, such
consumer expectations are typically overly optimistic. We
are not aware of seller disclosures of the percentage of cus-
tomers buying on rebate who subsequently redeem. Failure
to provide consumers with accurate information about
redemption likelihood, when consumers typically believe
otherwise, might be construed as a deceptive marketing
practice. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policy on decep-
tion (Ford and Calfee 1986; Miller 1983) holds that acts or
practices are deceptive if (1) there is a representation, omis-
sion, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer; (2)
the “reasonable” consumer would be so deceived; and (3)
the representation, omission, or practice is material.
Sellers appear to understand better than consumers that
when the time comes to redeem the rebates, many people do
not follow through. Silk and Janiszewski (2005) note that
apart from coupons, rebates are the most popular form of
promotion by consumer goods companies; they are also the
most common form of promotion used by technology retail-
ers, in part because rebates drive demand while limiting the
number of consumers who purchase at a discount. Silk and
Janiszewski surveyed 35 promotion managers who regularly
used rebates as a form of inducement to buy; the managers
estimated an overall redemption rate of 51%, with signifi-
cant variation across big-ticket items versus inexpensive
consumer goods. In line with our arguments, they estimated
that 64% of nonredemption is by consumers who would
have made a different choice without the rebate; they esti-
mated that only 36% of nonredemptions are by consumers
who would have bought the same alternative in the absence
of a rebate.
A parallel might be drawn between consumers’ misun-
derstanding of the likelihood that they will enjoy the prof-
fered benefit of a rebate-reduced price and the likelihood
that they will benefit from a weight-loss supplement. Con-
sider an advertisement that trumpets “Lose 5 pounds in 10
days,” with ad copy about how easy it is to lose weight by
taking the product three times a day, accompanied by
before-and-after pictures (FTC, Bureau of Consumer Pro-
tection 2001). If the product works, but only in conjunction
with a rigorous diet and exercise program, the advertisement
might be deceptive if it does not make sufficiently salient
the additional conditions that make even motivated con-
sumers unlikely to lose the promised weight. The FTC has
also advocated disclosures of success rates (Cleland et al.
2002).
With rebates, a similar argument could be made that sell-
ers should disclose and make salient the steps that are
required to redeem as well as the success rate (i.e., the fre-
quency of rebate redemptions). If consumers understand
that they are unlikely to redeem a rebate, they might give the
rebate less weight in choosing among competing products
than a somewhat smaller, though immediate, price reduc-
tion. Such an informational remedy might provide incen-
tives to marketers to compete by offering rebates that were
more attractive and easier to redeem (cf. Gabaix and Laib-
son 2006; Mulholland 2005).
The FTC is also authorized to act if it considers a mar-
keting practice unfair. Some people may believe that know-
ingly offering a rebate that a substantial percentage of con-
sumers are unlikely to redeem (though they believe
otherwise) is an unfair competitive practice. However, the
FTC appears to operate under a definition of unfairness that
makes this outcome unlikely: “As codified in 1994, for a
practice to be unfair, the injury it causes must be (1) sub-
stantial (2) without offsetting benefits and (3) one that con-
sumers cannot reasonably avoid” (Beales 2003, p. 195).
Consumers who follow the redemption protocol receive
the benefit, and they might point out that those who do not
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5Surprisingly, the balance of costs to benefits may be more favorable for
rebates with short deadlines to redeem (cf. Tversky and Shafir 1992). Silk
(2005) finds that with longer deadlines for rebate redemption, people are
more likely to choose a rebate option over alternatives with no rebate but
less likely to redeem the rebate. In Silk’s study, people paid their own
money for movie tickets and had a choice between a moderate price with
no rebate and a lower price with a rebate that would make that alternative
cheaper if redeemed. Consistent with our resource slack analysis, a 21-day
deadline rather than a 1-day deadline for rebate redemption on movie tick-
ets caused consumers to consider fewer factors that could potentially inter-
fere with redemption. However, consumers with the longer deadline subse-
quently reported that they had encountered more distractions that interfered
with redemption than consumers who had a 1-day deadline.
could have easily avoided the financial loss.5 However, it is
highly predictable that in the aggregate, consumers will
have low redemption rates. In Silk’s (2005) incentive-
compatible studies of rebate redemption, people were rea-
sonably accurate in their predictions of the aggregate level
of redemption, but they expected that they were personally
much more likely than the average person to redeem.
Notably, among participants who chose an alternative with
a rebate, there was no correlation between their estimated
probability that they would follow through to redeem and
their actual redemption behavior.
Even if there is deception or unfairness, no regulatory
intervention might be warranted if consumers learn over
time from feedback that they do not follow through to
redeem rebates (for evidence about consumer learning of
repeated choices involving the same rebate choices under
certain restrictive conditions, see Silk 2004, 2005), but we
argue that many purchases consumers make because of
rebates are “new.” If consumers buy a software package
with a rebate, for example, they might not remember or
reflect on whether they failed to follow through with
redemption in some other product class on some long-
distant prior occasion.
Public policy favors less restrictive informational reme-
dies if rebates are judged deceptive or unfair. However, we
are not sanguine that these kinds of standard informational
remedies would produce dramatic effects on consumers’
susceptibility to rebates or alter their probability of redemp-
tion. People fail to redeem rebates because of fundamental
and predictable principles of human motivation and cogni-
tion. Failure to redeem rebates is just a special case of
Zauberman and Lynch’s (2005) Yes … Damn! effect.
People systematically underestimate the burden of time
costs to be borne in the future and fail to learn from person-
ally relevant base-rate information that they later regret
committing to time-consuming activities in the future. As
work in temporal construal theory has shown, it is a funda-
mental property of human cognition that people can com-
prehend “complete” information about costs and benefits of
an action at a temporal distance and not appreciate how they
will reevaluate it when the action draws near.
If informational remedies are likely to have weak effects,
what else might work? One approach would be to restrict
sellers’ ability to offer rebates with a long time frame, on the
grounds that such rebates are inherently deceptive or unfair
(as supported by empirical work and sound psychology). If
rebates require fairly immediate action, people could realis-
tically appraise their likelihood of following through. Plac-
ing a short redemption deadline on consumers is no hard-
ship, because as we noted previously, people are more rather
than less likely to redeem a rebate with a shorter deadline.
The only reason this might pose a hardship to marketers is if
there were a higher proportion of redemptions, but of
course, this was the bargain they presumably made with
their customers.
An alternative remedy would be to require retailers to file
manufacturer rebates at checkout rather than leaving it to
consumers to mail in rebates from home. This would pre-
vent buyers from falling prey to their own self-deceptions
about their greater availability of time in the future. Silk
(2005) notes that a bill in California (SB 1154 Figueroa)
proposed to reduce the type of paperwork consumers are
required to submit to qualify for a rebate. Governor
Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill in September 2004.
It is outside the scope of our expertise to judge whether
any remedy is likely to be considered or adopted for promo-
tional incentives (e.g., rebates) that provide an economic
benefit to some consumers but significant costs to others.
Our aim is not to propose solutions but to suggest that a bet-
ter understanding of consumers’ psychological limitations
and mental representations of temporally near and distant
outcomes and actions would facilitate such an assessment.
This type of analysis (and contributions from psychological
science) could also provide insights that might be useful in
identifying circumstances that contribute to deceptive and
unfair practices.
Other Sales Practices Preying on Consumers’
Illusions About Time
We noted previously that people chronically believe that
they will have more time in the future than they have in the
present (Zauberman and Lynch 2005). Many high-ticket
products require a significant investment of time to enjoy
the benefit (e.g., time-share vacation homes, season tickets
to sporting events or concert series, gym memberships,
DVD subscription services). The market for many of these
goods may depend in part on consumers’ false presupposi-
tions that they will be able to engage in future activities that
they are not able to engage in today.
A possible remedy might be to regulate products and ser-
vices with these characteristics to allow consumers lenient
return conditions after some modest period of time in which
their long-term low-usage level will have a chance to be
revealed to new customers. Ironically, however, the behav-
ioral literature suggests that such lenient return policies have
the opposite effect of the intended purpose. Wood (2001)
shows that lenient return policies encourage people to buy
under the false presumption that they are “trying” rather
than committing to a product or service; subsequently, they
are as unwilling to reverse a decision as if the return policies
had been strict. Consistent with our resource slack account,
consumers believe that when the product is purchased or the
membership is activated, they will follow up to opt out, but
when the time comes, they do not believe that they have suf-
ficient time slack to do so. In this case, class action lawsuits
may provide a better remedy than regulation.
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Time-Inconsistent Preferences: Extreme
Weight on the Present
In the preceding section, we focused on the psychological
processes that lead to the devaluation of consequences in the
more distant future. In this section, we focus on special
problems that arise when the current period is dispropor-
tionately higher weighted than all other periods, including
the near future. That is, the weight of outcomes declines
especially steeply from t0 to t1 compared with any other t(n)
and t(n + 1), and this cannot be explained by choosing some
appropriate value of the discount rate ρ in Equation 1.
Equation 1 implies that if people prefer a smaller reward
at time t(0) to a larger reward at t(1), they should prefer the
same smaller reward at t(n) to the larger reward at t(n + 1).
This follows mathematically from Equation 1 because the
ratio of the weight of t(n)/t(n + 1) should be the same for all
values of n. Instead, hundreds of studies have found that
preferences are present biased (Strotz 1956; Thaler 1981)
and, thus, time inconsistent. For example, if people are
asked whether they prefer two cookies today or three cook-
ies tomorrow, many people might choose two cookies
today, but if the same people are offered the choice of two
cookies in a month or three cookies in a month plus one day,
most would choose the larger, later reward over the smaller,
sooner one. This phenomenon occurs especially when out-
comes are represented concretely (Malkoc and Zauberman
2006) and are tangible, immediate, and physically present
(Metcalfe and Mischel 1999).
This phenomenon of disproportionately weighting out-
comes in the current period and the consequent reversal of
preferences as distant consequences draw near in time has
been demonstrated repeatedly in both humans and lower
animals (e.g., Ainslie and Herrnstein 1981). In the literature,
this has been referred to as “decreasing impatience,”
“present-biased preferences,” and “hyperbolic discounting,”
and it has been modeled with hyperbolic (e.g., Ainslie 1975;
Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Kirby 1997) and quasi-hyperbolic
discounting functions (e.g., Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999; Zauberman 2003) rather than the kind of expo-
nential discounting function in Equation 1. What is common
to these alternative models is the assumption that more
weight is given to outcomes in the first period than in sub-
sequent periods and that this tendency becomes stronger as
the first period draws nearer in time. Therefore, the ratio of
the weight of outcomes at t(n)/t(n + 1) increases as t(n)
draws nearer in time.
Self-Control Problems and Precommitment
Time-inconsistent preferences lead to problems of self-
control. The problem is that the same decision between
smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards appears different
when the smaller, sooner reward is close from when it is
viewed as far off in time in either the future or the past.
Before going out for dinner, it is clear to a dieter that he or
she should avoid a rich dessert that will add pounds in the
long run, but when the moment of truth arrives along with
the dessert cart, the dieter may find that the fattening choco-
late cake is irresistible, even though it interferes with the
attainment of a larger, long-term goal of health. Similarly, a
recovering alcoholic may resolve to drink water at a party
but find him- or herself powerfully attracted to drink alcohol
when it is readily available.
If people consider it in their long-term interests to be
guided by the preferences from a greater distance, how do
they avoid giving in to the temptation to choose the smaller,
sooner reward when it draws near in time? In Homer’s
Odyssey, the irresistible Sirens attracted sailors by their
sweet singing, luring them to shipwreck and death. Wanting
to hear their song and yet survive, Ulysses plugged the ears
of his oarsmen with wax and ordered them to lash him to the
mast so that they would not give in to the temptation and
turn his ship toward the Sirens.
Research has shown that as with Ulysses, both humans
and animals sometimes select precommitment devices that
constrain their choices or that self-impose penalties for devi-
ation from their long-term preferences. Some rats can learn
to press a bar that allows them to avoid making a choice
between an immediate, smaller reward of food pellets and a
larger, later reward (Ainslie 1975). Similarly, humans have
been shown to use precommitment devices, such as buying
small packs of sin products (e.g., cigarettes), to constrain
consumption (Wertenbroch 1998). Ariely and Wertenbroch
(2002) show that students who were wary of their own
temptation to procrastinate chose early assignment dead-
lines for themselves and imposed costly penalties for failing
to meet the deadlines. Students who did not make such
choices received lower course grades, implying that the use
of these costly bets is functional.
From a public policy perspective, a key point is that inter-
nal self-control and externally induced self-control are sub-
stitutable (cf. Mazar and Ariely 2006). Fishbach and Trope
(2005) show that if there are external inducements to influ-
ence the choice of larger, later rewards over smaller, sooner
ones, people reduce their use of internal self-control strate-
gies. For example, if a company health plan rewards people
for engaging in more physical exercise, this undercuts per-
sonal self-control motivation. Especially dangerous is a pol-
icy that imposes external inducements for temporary self-
control. When the external inducement is removed, internal
motivation is likely to be weaker than if the external induce-
ment had never been introduced. In addition, we subse-
quently argue that in many, if not most, situations, people
regularly fail to exercise self-control and avoid temptation
because they fail to predict the full power of the situation.
Affective Determinants of Present-Biased
Preferences and Impulsiveness
As we described previously, there is an extensive body of
evidence that people weigh the present more than any other
time period. This is especially true for outcomes that are
vivid, tangible, and immediate. Metcalfe and Mischel’s
(1999) work on “hot/cool” systems illustrates this principle.
The desire for immediate gratification—for a cookie, for
example—is significantly stronger when this cookie is visi-
ble than when it is out of sight.
Present-biased preferences are governed by different psy-
chological causes from standard discounting of distant-
future outcomes. As far back as Freud ([1923] 1962, 1933),
the strong power of proximate stimuli has been attributed to
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the animal instincts of the id, and the more reflective prefer-
ences have been attributed to the ego, which keeps the id
under control. Freud likened the id to a horse and the ego to
the rider that keeps the horse under control and that engages
in more deliberative long-term planning. Most recent theo-
rizing has attributed present-biased preferences to the opera-
tion of relatively automatic, hot affective systems that can
sometimes be overridden only by some cool, effortful,
deliberative system.
Hot Present-Biased Preferences
Loewenstein’s (1996) influential concept of “visceral fac-
tors” holds that some rewards may be discounted steeply
because they become overpoweringly attractive as they
draw nearer (in temporal or physical distance) when in a
state of deprivation, causing drivelike affective reactions.
People exhibit a willingness to trade any amount of another
resource for the visceral reward. For example, hunger, thirst,
sexual arousal, addictive drug deprivation, and sleep depri-
vation have the potential to overwhelm other motives that
the decision maker might deem to be more important when
viewed from a distance before or after a decision.
Loewenstein (1996) gives the example of sleep depriva-
tion interrogation techniques used by the Israeli Mossad.
Detainees are later baffled at how they were induced to
reveal so much information without any physical threat, but
in a deprivation state, the appeal of an hour of sleep is so
great that the detainee will betray a cause that he or she
viewed as the most central value in life. Similarly, people
who, in a cool state, never imagined engaging in risky,
unprotected sex change their preferences when in a state of
sexual arousal (Ariely and Loewenstein 2006).
Loewenstein (1996) contrasts visceral factors with other,
more utilitarian resources that exhibit lower, more “normal”
levels of impatience and less pronounced interaction of
stimulus proximity and deprivation state. Shiv and
Fedorikhin (1999) examine choice between hedonic vices,
such as chocolate cake, and virtues, such as fruit salad, and
show that people are more likely to choose the virtuous
product when they have more mental resources and when
stimulus proximity is less—for example, when the physical
dessert is replaced by a picture. This is consistent with Met-
calfe and Mischel’s (1999) work on hot/cool systems, which
also points out that psychological proximity enhances bias
toward the present. Work showing higher discount rates for
addictive substances than for money is also relevant (Baker,
Johnson, and Bickel 2003; Kirby, Petry, and Bickel 1999).
This again points to the idea that high-arousal states lead
people to focus on the present and virtually ignore future
consequences.
Recent research in neuroscience provides further evi-
dence that different mechanisms operate when decisions
involve outcomes in the immediate present. Different
regions of the brain are activated during lower-level auto-
matic responses and higher-level reasoning. The two types
of activation have been shown to have different neural cor-
relates in studies that use fMRI (functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging), a technique that measures blood flows to
different regions of the brain, as a function of different types
of stimulation. McClure and colleague (2004) find that the
6Behavioral economics work on present-biased preferences distinguishes
between naive and sophisticated agents, with the latter understanding the
time inconsistency of their own preferences (e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin
1999).
limbic system is more activated in decisions that involve
immediate rewards, whereas the areas of the lateral pre-
frontal cortex are activated independent of the timing of the
reward. This suggests that information disseminated by
regulators to influence impulsive behavior is unlikely to be
effective at the time of decision when a consumer is in a hot
arousal state, because these decisions are likely to be domi-
nated by the lower-level, automatic responses of the limbic
system.
Misprediction and the “Hot/Cold Empathy Gap”
A policy analyst may question why consumers need protec-
tion from themselves when they make “impulsive” choices
that disagree with their long-term preferences. After all, if
consumers know that their preferences will change in the
face of temptation in a way that violates their long-term
preferences, is it not their responsibility to avoid the temp-
tation? For example, dieters might avoid the temptation of
junk food simply by avoiding entering a fast-food establish-
ment. Teenagers who do not want to be sexually active can
avoid putting themselves in a situation in which they will be
tempted or able to act on the temptation.6
We noted previously that in some cases, people are able
to make use of precommitment devices. A fundamental rea-
son people so often fail to take such self-control measures is
what Loewenstein (1996) and others label the “hot/cold
empathy gap.” Research shows that the power of the present
and immediate gratification can be overwhelming in a way
that people do not anticipate (e.g., Brendl, Markman, and
Messner 2003). People in a cold state mispredict how they
will behave in a hot state. If people cannot imagine how
overpowering the temptation will be, they cannot be
expected to take protective action to avoid the tempting
situations.
Loewenstein (1996) argues that this misprediction arises
from a mismatch in affective intensity levels in a hot state
and in a cold state. When people are in a given state of
arousal (i.e., hot), they cannot anticipate how they will
behave when they are in a different state (i.e., cold). For
example, people purchase more groceries when they are
hungry. There is also evidence that people in cold states can-
not anticipate their behavior in a hot state. For example,
Read and Van Leeuwen (1998) asked participants to choose
in advance between healthful and unhealthful snacks (i.e.,
fruit versus junk food) that they would receive one week
later. Participants made this decision when they were either
hungry (late in the afternoon) or not hungry (after lunch).
One week later, they made a subsequent immediate choice,
with an opportunity to change what they selected in
advance. As predicted, Read and Van Leeuwen found that
advance choices were influenced by current hunger and
future hunger. Hungry participants chose more junk food
than did those who were not hungry. In addition, partici-
pants chose significantly more junk food for immediate
choice than for advance choice (see also Van Boven and
Loewenstein 2003).
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Policy Implications of Present-Biased Preferences
Present-biased preferences can occur across a wide set of
domains, both hot and cold. However, these problems are
particularly problematic for various kinds of sin products,
which explains poor consumer decisions about products
with addictive characteristics and visceral properties, such
as drugs, sex, and food.
For example, food consumption is a growing problem,
and obesity is becoming a serious health concern. The impli-
cations of the intertemporal processes we described previ-
ously question the effectiveness of simply using cold infor-
mational approaches to improve food choice (cf.
Verplanken and Wood 2006). For example, a standard
approach to the problem of obesity is to explain to con-
sumers the calorie contents of various foods they might eat
in relation to recommended daily caloric contents (Chandon
and Wansink 2005). Similarly, the Nutrition Education
Labeling Act aimed to improve nutritional choices by better
provision of nutrition information (Moorman 1996). Alter-
natively, companies might try to provide better information
about the efficacy of various commercially available
weight-loss products (Cleland et al. 1997). However, if
unhealthful food choices arise from being in a hot state of
hunger and in proximity to sinful foods, informational reme-
dies may have limited success.
Another standard tool in the public policy arsenal is to
increase the costs of socially undesirable behavior. Accord-
ing to the research we just reviewed, some such remedies
used to discourage consumption of sin products do not
work. The visceral-factors account shows that someone in a
state of deprivation (i.e., a hot state) with a proximate vis-
ceral reward is highly insensitive to costs. This is the reason
recovering alcoholics break down when they are in close
proximity to alcohol. Similarly, increasing taxes on ciga-
rettes will have little effect on consumption of cigarettes
when someone is in a hot state of nicotine deprivation and
in the proximity of triggering stimuli.
Therefore, we recommend consideration of another gen-
eral policy remedy to dysfunctional impulsive behavior,
namely, the institutionalization of precommitment devices
to avoid yielding to temptation. Returning to our food-
choice example, one potential remedy for child obesity
problems might be to make school lunch decisions at home
for a week (or a month) at a time. This would reduce the
possibility for impulsive, hot decisions while children are
hungry and standing in line. Ironically, if people are given a
choice of whether to order in advance or at the cafeteria, we
expect that most people would choose the latter. They would
fail to anticipate the hot/cold empathy gap and would per-
ceive no benefit of removing the ability to choose at the last
minute.
In another variant of the “removing-the-proximal-
stimulus” approach, schoolchildren could be encouraged to
make better choices in the school lunch line by making
choices before entering the line, with exposure to “surro-
gates” that make the tempting stimulus less tangible (i.e.,
pictures versus physical products; Shiv and Fedhorikhin
1999). Finally, in some domains, actual physical restraints
could work (e.g., putting sugary cereals on high shelves in
grocery stores so that young children cannot reach them).
Present-Biased Preferences and Impulsiveness:
Cognitive Determinants
Thus far, we have associated impulsive behavior with “vis-
ceral” stimuli, but Zauberman and Lynch (2005) argue that
similar impulsiveness and time inconsistency can arise
when people approach any highly valued goal. That is,
impulsiveness and time inconsistency need not be confined
to hedonic or visceral sin products but can influence any
purchase that invokes strong goal-approach motives. For
example, Malkoc and Zauberman (2006) provide further
evidence that the degree to which intertemporal preferences
are present-biased depends on cognitive factors—in their
case, the concreteness of the mental representation of
events.
Cooling-off laws are an appropriate remedy for consumer
“mistakes” due to extreme valuation of highly proximate
products that lead to time-inconsistent preferences (Petty
1998; cf. McChesney 1984). A cooling-off period is simply
some period of time in which a consumer has the option to
“rescind, disaffirm, or revoke a contract, or more generally
as a withdrawal right” (Rekaiti and Van den Bergh 2000, p.
371). For example, Connecticut requires a three-day
cooling-off period that allows buyers of weight-loss pro-
gram services to reconsider and have their money refunded
(Cleland et al. 1997). Cooling-off laws could also mitigate
some of the problems that arise from people’s inability to
anticipate their own preferences under different arousal
states. Such laws need to include a period in which con-
sumers are not allowed to “accept the offer made and con-
clude the contract” (Rekaiti and Van den Bergh 2000, p.
371). The main argument for this remedy is that it allows a
correction for a market inefficiency caused by consumers’
inability to exercise a choice that is consistent with their
long-term interests. There is a debate about what is the “cor-
rect” preference. In this article, we argue only that most con-
sumers should not regret their purchases after they make
them.
We argued previously that liberal return policies can actu-
ally encourage consumers to buy under a false presupposi-
tion that they will later take the time to return a disappoint-
ing product. Cooling-off laws do not suffer from this
problem because they do not endow the tentatively chosen
product with default status or require effort to opt out, thus
discouraging consumers from undoing a purchase they may
regret a few days after buying.
Conclusions
This article provides a selective review of the most impor-
tant issues in intertemporal choice research and its policy
implications. We focused on two main themes: (1) devalua-
tion of distant- versus near-future outcomes and (2) over-
valuation of the present versus any other point in the future.
We demonstrate that each of these phenomena has distinct
implications that might require different interventions to
help consumers make better decisions.
We reviewed two theories of the cognitive underpinnings
of discounting: temporal construal theory (Trope and Liber-
man 2003) and resource slack theory (Zauberman and
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Lynch 2005). In both cases, the key implication for policy
makers trying to induce some socially desirable pattern of
behavior is to manipulate people’s temporal perspective. If
an action causes some mixture of costs and benefits,
construal-level theory suggests that costs (and probabilities)
will loom larger in the near term than in the more distant
future. In the near term, the costs may outweigh the benefits,
but when viewed from a greater temporal distance, the costs
seem to fade away, and the benefits remain. To induce a pat-
tern of long-term desirable behavior, people must be
induced to precommit to a decision at some point in the
more distant future. This is the concept underlying Thaler
and Benartzi’s (2004) Save More Tomorrow program,
which induces people to save for retirement by changing the
decision from saving in the present to saving in the future.
In other cases, the socially undesirable behavior comes
from underweighting costs in the future. In this case, the
policy prescription is the opposite; namely, induce people to
make decisions about the future as if the consequences were
effective immediately. This was the thrust of our recom-
mendation for correcting implicit deception from rebates
that require time investments in the future. People imagine
having more time slack in the future than they actually expe-
rience, so they mispredict that they will redeem the rebates
that induced them to purchase. We recommended regula-
tions that require sellers to offer only rebates that must be
redeemed immediately or class-action lawsuits to allow con-
sumers redress if the recommended regulations prove incon-
sistent with prevailing FTC unfairness doctrine.
Our article also reviewed evidence showing that people
overvalue the present compared with any other time period,
resulting in inconsistent preferences over time. These time-
inconsistent preferences can then lead to problems of self-
control. When viewing a situation from a distance, con-
sumers may prefer to eat virtuous, healthful food rather than
tempting, but unhealthful food. However, the same con-
sumers may have problems upholding their decisions when
the tempting food is proximate. If we acknowledge the
affective and cognitive drivers that lead consumers to dis-
play present-biased preferences, we might be able to come
up with more effective remedies.
Given these robust, myopic preferences, informational
remedies are not likely to be effective, because these affec-
tively driven decisions are controlled by brain processes that
are unlikely to be accompanied by retrieval of information
disseminated by regulators or companies. Instead, funda-
mentally different approaches are necessary, such as the
institutionalization of self-control strategies that remove
people from the tempting stimulus or that provide them
recourse if they buy in the heat of the moment. Consumers
are unlikely to adopt such self-control strategies indepen-
dently if they mispredict the power of temptation as a result
of the hot/cold empathy gap.
In summary, we argue that a better understanding of how
consumers think about present and future consequences is
critical to any public policy analysis of consumer decisions
that include an intertemporal component. Future policy
analysis of such decisions will benefit from attention to
knowledge that is accumulated in this important stream of
behavioral research.
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